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THE SOLDIER IN PEACE AND WAR.

SUGGESTIONS
FOR ARMING AND TRAINING
LIGHT INFANTRY,

WITH
OBSERVATIONS ON RECRUITING.

By. LT.-COL. ———

LONDON :
BURNS & LAMBERT, 17 PORTMAN STREET,
AND 63 PATERNOSTER ROW.

1855.

THE SOLDIER IN PEACE AND WAR

BY

THE LIEUTENANT AND CAPTAIN

JOHN B. HARRIS

OF

THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

IN TWO VOLUMES

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W. DAVY & SON, Printers, 8, Gilbert Street, Oxford Street.



TO ALL WHO DESIRE SUCCESS TO OUR ARMS,

AND

JUSTICE TO OUR SOLDIERS,

THESE FEW PAGES ARE RESPECTFULLY ADDRESSED.

B

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THE SOLDIER IN PEACE AND WAR.

CHAPTER I.

AN IMPROVED TRAINING REQUIRED FOR SERVICE.

WITHOUT descending one inch from that high position which the British Soldier deservedly occupies, he must admit, that experience has established, as facts: that the equipment and organization of our army are defective; and that certain modifications and changes are requisite, to meet the exigences of the service.

We have a powerful, bold, and enterprising enemy to contend with; to whom we can afford to offer no further advantages, than those which he already derives from his national resources, his military organization, and his political craft and sagacity. To uphold the reputation of our arms, and to ensure a successful issue to the

gigantic struggle, in which we are engaged; we must give the English Soldier the training, the equipment, and the arms, which will best enable him to cope with his enemy; and to maintain his health and vigour, amidst the hardships, exposure, and vicissitudes, which are inseparable from a campaign.

The condition of the Soldier is a subject which is forced upon us, alike by considerations of justice, policy, and necessity. It is no more than is due to those gallant men, who are ever ready to meet an enemy more numerous than themselves. It is no more than is suggested by the best interests of a nation, making, already, large sacrifices of treasure and commercial prosperity, in the prosecution of a war in which its sympathies are embarked. It is no more than is demanded by the stern voice of necessity, if we desire to maintain our position among the powers of Europe; and to husband the most precious portion of the national capital—the youth and energy, the strength and sinew of the land.

A long interval of peace has, naturally, led to the cultivation of those arts, and the assumption of those habits, which belong to peaceful times. And the Army, receiving something of the national impression, while maintaining its spirit and its discipline, has been equipped and instructed,

in a great measure, rather for parade than service. The most admirable precision of movement, and the most unimpeachable accuracy of touch, dressing, and carriage, were indeed obtained. At "attention," the little fingers never strayed from the seams of the trousers; the chins, as scrupulously, avoided the unbending stocks; the coatees were without a wrinkle; the belts without a stain; the wings were like driven snow. The cleanest, as the bravest—the smartest, as the most uncomfortable of men, the British Soldier was only truly "at ease," when "improperly dressed,"—only comfortable, when unbuttoned. The young officers, partaking of the infliction, escaped, very naturally, on every occasion, into "mufti"; and however dashing and high-spirited, directed little of their energy into professional studies and pursuits; for which, in truth, there was but moderate opportunity and scant encouragement.

In peace, this narrow system, if unfavourable to the true military spirit, was not, at least, disastrous. The Soldier was taught to believe that its endurance was a part of discipline essential to efficiency, and he resigned himself accordingly.* The days of rugged war, however, arrived

* It must not be inferred from the above observations, that we undervalue steadiness and precision; any more than a per-

at length, and the peace education was put to a rude and trying test. . Its failure was signal. But the trussed up army soon fell into the opposite extreme of looseness. Loose in dress, loose in drill. Down went the shakos ; off went the wings ; away went the stocks. There was a worse evil : men who had been accustomed to associate the old, stuck-up, German system with the idea of steadiness and efficiency, began to feel that in losing their pipe-clay they were losing a part of their discipline, and a portion of their efficiency. Such impressions are never without mischief. The standard adopted for the Army, should be one which can be maintained in the field ; not one which breaks down in the first month of service. How the old system worked last summer in Bulgaria, last winter in the Crimea, it is unnecessary to dwell upon.

If something had to be abandoned, much had also to be learnt—that various knowledge which

son need be insensible of the importance of grammar, while exposing pedantry and bombast. We fully recognize the importance of the slow, and patient, rudimentary drill and instruction, which, are given to the recruit ; and still more so the strict discipline, and thorough *breaking-in*, which convert the rustic into the soldier. But, we would not confound stiffness with steadiness ; nor mistake for efficiency and excellence, what is only one of the means of contributing to that result.

is essential to enable the Soldier to live in time of war. Much impatience, (perhaps some unreasonable indignation,) has been expressed by the public, at the defects which experience has exposed with unsparing hand. But, a complicated machinery, which has long been unused, rarely works smoothly at first. The necessity for some modification in the training, equipment, and organization of the Army was reasonably to be anticipated by those who reflected that forty years of peace had left our military institutions almost stationary, amidst the universal progress of every art and science, which is applicable to the profession of arms.

Our experience has been dearly bought; but, having been paid for, let us study the lesson carefully; and profit by it largely. It is inscribed in legible characters. It is written, alas! in the ravines before Sebastopol; it is recorded in the graveyards of Scutari.

The Commissariat, the Medical Department, the Transport Service, the "*Intendance Militaire*," we leave to abler men. We shall not attempt to treat the entire subject of our military organization. One branch only of the service will we presume to deal with—the equipment and training of the Light Infantry Soldier. Even here we would speak rather in the tone of sugges-

tion than authority ; appealing respectfully, but confidently, to the decision of common sense and military *experience in the field*, which have already introduced so many useful and valuable changes, for which the Soldier may well feel grateful.

To promote such further alterations as are requisite to do justice to our matchless Infantry ; to develop their energies, especially as light troops ; and to bring into action the means of success at our disposal, and the resources at our command, is the object of these pages.

CHAPTER II.

THE ESSENTIALS FOR AN EFFECTIVE ARMY.

It appears unnecessary to demonstrate that the proper education for a Soldier is to prepare him for war—for we speak not here of his duties as domestic police. In war the essentials for efficiency in an army are, that it should be able *to live, to move, and to fight*. To LIVE HARDILY, to MARCH STOUTLY, and to FIGHT SKILFULLY, are the three objects to be ever kept in view, in training the recruit and equipping the Soldier for the field.* Let us apply these three maxims

* We say nothing of pluck and bottom. The English Soldier can no more help being brave, than he can help being descended from those who fought with the Black Prince and Harry of Monmouth. The question is not of the material of which our Armies are composed, but of how that material is to

to the drill and appointments of the Light Infantry man.

TO LIVE,

FOOD, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER ARE REQUIRED.

Food.—The Soldier should be taught (and practised) how to cook, and how to economise and make the most of his food. He should be instructed in what manner to make the various rations, he is likely to meet with on service, as wholesome and palatable as may be; and his rations ought, therefore, to be, occasionally, varied—pork, salt-beef, rice, coffee, &c. The importance of this was never more manifest than last winter. The French Soldier, with soaked biscuit and rice, and a morsel of pork, would make a wholesome and very tolerable soup, which maintained his health and vigour; while our poor fellows, unable, with weakened stomachs, to get down their dry biscuit, or digest their ill-cooked pork, were dying of dysentery and diarrhœa. This cooking, remember, is a question, not of *luxury*, but often of *life*. Collecting fuel, establishing the cook-house, making the soup of such

be worked up—how we are to make of it the most complete and powerful engine, by which the national interests may be protected, and the honour of the Crown upheld.

materials as are at hand, roasting, grinding (without a mill) and preparing the coffee, and such like little culinary arts, are easily acquired. Yet who, that passed last winter before Sebastopol, will deny, that the simple lesson was taught at the cost of much suffering and privation, if not by the sacrifice of many valuable lives. Even now, can we say that our men have learnt, when three or four days rations are distributed for a lengthened march, to use them with economy and regularity? Yet this frugal foresight (in many military operations of vital importance) may be instilled into the Soldier, by habit and training. What we contend for is,—that mere parade drill and interior economy as practised in barracks, do not suffice. But, that really to fit the Soldier to take the field, he should be inured to, and practised in, whatever is essential to his health and life, in presence of the enemy.

Clothing.—Without entering into details (which in this place appears unnecessary) as to colour, shape, and material, we would submit that for the duties of Light Infantry in the field, as well as for health, the utmost freedom of limb should be allowed. The comfort, as well as the smartness of the Soldier, should be considered. His dress should be loose, stout, and convenient. Its colour,

as a rule, should be the *least conspicuous possible* : though, to produce the same effect at a little distance, colours may be blended—as light grey, or buff, with black lace, or braid. The red coat, or even the dark rifle-green, is discernible at a distance ; while our object is concealment from an enemy, who is to be watched, approached, perhaps surprised. Every sportsman knows how difficult it is to find the hare upon her form, or the partridge on a fallow. Would a magpie be difficult to discover ? We would make the alteration, of clothing our skirmishers, rather as partridges than as magpies.

These observations, it will be remembered, have reference to Light Troops. For the regiments of the Line and Household Brigade, we would retain the glorious national colour, so rich in heroic associations ; and would let our stately lines advance, as heretofore, upon the enemy, in all the blaze of scarlet. Whether, with the improved projectiles now in use, it be wise to retain our cumbersome and conspicuous Colours, which cost the lives of so many gallant young spirits, whose honorable, but fatal, duty it is to bear them in the field, is a question worthy of grave and careful consideration. In Light Infantry regiments, which must be content to sacrifice to effi-

ciency, and to their peculiar duties, some portion of the "pomp and circumstance," &c., they are, clearly, out of place.

But even after suitable clothing has been provided, the rough work of warfare soon causes it to wear. To renew and repair it, should be within the resources of every regiment. Some boon might, possibly, be granted to those who could maintain their own; and in clothes, as well as food, the Soldier should be taught to rely, so far as circumstances would allow, upon himself. Can it be expected that men will be ready to wash their own shirts and mend their own stockings, during a campaign, if they be totally ignorant how to do either? We have, before now, seen a Field Officer darning his own stockings—probably, his best pair; and many a man would have escaped from the horrors of body-lice, and frozen feet, if he had learnt to practise these humble, but useful arts of washing and mending. We have frequently remarked that the French African regiments, long trained to camp life, were constantly washing their clothes, in every little stream and puddle; and that the drawers, and stockings, and other clothing, which our men thoughtlessly and improvidently, cast away when soiled, were carried off by the Zouaves,

with the cool and practical observation, "*ça se lave.*"

Shelter.—After food and clothing, the shelter of the Soldier demands our care. Here also, much depends upon himself. The old campaigner makes himself snug and warm, where the raw recruit would remain wet, cold and comfortless. Will it be said that this is soon learnt? Yet the loss of almost an entire regiment, last winter, was ascribed to ignorance of this simple thing. But it is not the mere pitching a bell-tent, which is required. The Light Infantry regiment should be almost independent of such shelter. The advanced post, the out-lying picket, the secret expedition, may often have to rely upon their own ingenuity, for shelter from the heat, cold, or rain. The mud cabin, the hut of branches, the little *tente à l'abri*, as occasion requires, ought alike to protect them from the elements; and with the use and construction of each should they be made familiar.

CHAPTER III.

TO MARCH.

PRECISION,—RAPIDITY,—STOUTNESS.

The first, and the most laborious part of the education of the recruit is, to teach him *to march*. We may almost pronounce, that a Soldier who can stand perfectly square, and march perpendicularly to his front, is well drilled. It is not here that the British Soldier is defective: his imposing advance in line (the most important and difficult of all movements), and his general steadiness and accuracy in manœuvre, can hardly be surpassed. In executing a movement in presence of an enemy, there are, however, two *desiderata*, viz.—*precision* and *rapidity*. The first we have attained, but in the latter we are still far behind our allies. There is no reason why our Light Infantry should not move, habitually, at the same

pace as the *Chasseurs à pied*, who march in column of route, and execute every manœuvre at the *pas gymnastique*,* while, in extended order, they perform their evolutions with admirable accuracy and intelligence, at the *pas de course*.

The advantage of rapidity of movement in front of an enemy is self-evident. But, it is less in action, than in all the preliminary marches and the changes of position which precede a battle, that celerity is conducive to success. It is an axiom, that an army which can out-march another, if equal to it in numbers, and mere fighting qualities, is far more powerful and efficient. The fame of "Crauford's Light Division" rested quite as much on their powers of marching, as of fighting. And in the French army, those regiments which, deservedly, enjoy the highest reputation, are the active and dashing *Chasseurs à pied*, already referred to, and the Zouaves, whose ra-

* One hundred and twenty paces per minute, being about eleven per cent. faster than our quick-march. The "*pas de course cadencée*" is two hundred paces per minute. At this pace they are not only practised in manœuvre, but in carrying gabions, ladders, &c. and men upon stretchers, that they may become quick and handy in bearing off their wounded comrades. Vide "*Bibliothèque du sous officier*." The colonel of a French regiment is forbidden, by the regulations of the service, to make any innovations in the "*Instruction pour la gymnastique*."

pidity of movement, and powers of endurance in the long forced march, not less than their impetuous valour, have long caused them to be regarded, as the right arm of the French African Army. Depth of chest, and strength of muscle, are the first qualities for a Zouave. A well-known French general used to measure candidates for that corps, round the chest and calf. If the result indicated constitution and vigour, he accepted him. “*Viola un Zouave.*”

The French, who are admirable critics in military matters, extol with enthusiasm, the coolness of our men under fire, and what they call our “*solidité remarquable.*” But, it is not less true that they lament and censure our “*lenteur funeste,*” which they consider most wasteful of life. It is hardly necessary to prove that if a battery, or a regiment, fire with a given speed (their utmost) on an advancing force, the number of rounds to which the assailants will be exposed, must be proportionate to the *time* they are *under fire*; in other words, to the *speed* at which they advance.

We are aware that only a certain rate of speed, is compatible with the steady movement of large masses of men. But, we do not think that, even in Battalion regiments, that rate has been yet attained. However, we confine ourselves, here,

to the question of light troops, with whom, rapidity is almost synonymous with efficiency. If the enemy has to be anticipated; an important position to be seized; a surprise to be effected; celerity is the key to success. In the foraging expedition; cutting off the enemy's convoys; or the adventurous reconnaissance; it is the same. To advance with impunity, and retire with safety, is the achievement, only, of troops who can out-march, and out-manceuvre the masses of the enemy. It is difficult to assign limits to all that may be effected by troops, who can march with *rapidity* and *stoutness*, and who are warily and boldly led. But, it is certain, at least, even as regards armies, that the great prizes of war, have been borne off by generals, who have astonished and crushed their enemies, by the audacity and rapidity of their movements and combinations. What the French call their "*mobilité*," and "*élan*," have been the great secrets of the triumphs of their arms. Napoleon's first campaign in Italy, was little more than one continued series of forced marches. But we are digressing; and we will consider how the object of stout and rapid marching is to be attained.

In the first place, all unnecessary weight, and impediments are to be removed. Who would walk for a wager in a heavy shako, a stiff stock,

and a tight coat and trousers? Soldiers, often, be it borne in mind, *do walk for a wager*. The prize is victory. *The stakes are life and death*. The clothing should be adapted in shape, fit, and quality, for men who have immense exertions to perform. The "pack" should be reduced to the minimum, consistent with the comfort of the soldier; and the arms should be the handiest and lightest, that will ensure entire efficiency. Still, after all this, the Light Infantry soldier, fully equipped for the field, has to bear a heavy load, and to carry it far and fast. He must be trained for the work he has to do. He must be TRAINED TO CARRY IT FAR AND FAST. Athletic exercises; gymnastics, as practised by the *Chasseurs à pied*; (of which our "extension motions" are a sort of A B C); long and frequent marches—such is the severe, but necessary training, required to form a first rate Light Infantry regiment, *for service*. Nothing less than what is first-rate will ensure success in war. Excellence, everywhere, wins! Excellence is the aim of every military man who deserves the name of a soldier. And in this commercial country, better than in any other, is appreciated "the value of a first-rate article." It is what the assembled merchants and politicians, in the city, so loudly seem to demand. Will those gentlemen permit us, calmly,

to remind them of what we believe to be a city axiom, that to "command a first-rate article, you must pay a liberal price." We say nothing, here, of the superior officers: but, is it a *liberal price* which is paid for the *labour and blood of the British soldier*? Has he the wages of the mechanic, or artisan?—of the coal-heaver, or the navy? And, be it distinctly observed, you require the intelligence of the one, united with the energy and endurance of the other, to cope with the difficulties, meet the vicissitudes, and sustain the hardships, of the Light Infantry soldier in the field.

We will return to this question, in some observations, we will venture to make, upon the subject of recruiting.

CHAPTER IV.

TO FIGHT.

ARMS,—SKILL,—CONFIDENCE.

To fight successfully, is the result which it is the purpose of every department of the army, every functionary, from the Drill Serjeant to the Commander-in-chief, to secure. For, all their combined exertions have no other end in view, than to give the soldier health and strength; and discipline and confidence, to enable him to fight and conquer. The battle field is the grand terminus, at which, all the various ways of promoting the interests of the service, converge: and it is there that every department is finally, and irrevocably, tested.

It is our object to consider how the Light Infantry soldier is to achieve his portion of the arduous task. What is his work? and how is he to do it? His work is, simply, to cope successfully with every enemy, whom it is his duty to encounter. How is he to do it? He must do it, like every other successful workman, by the superiority of his tools, or, his surpassing skill in using them.

We have presumed to offer some observations,

as to how light troops should be trained to *live*, and *march*, (two preliminary acquirements). We will now suggest how they should be trained to *fight*. The best weapons, with the most skilful use of them, is what we want. First, as to the weapon. In marching we have seen that speed is power. In fighting also, where the contest is with projectiles, the *rate of rapidity* of fire (and its amount therefore within a given time), is also the *measure of its effect*—weight of metal, and accuracy of direction, being equal.

If, for example, two *corps* of 1000 strong be opposed to each other, the one firing two rounds per minute, and the other one round only, and if one shot in ten put a man “hors de combat,” the result will be, that they will stand thus respectively.

Corps firing 2 rounds per minute—		Corps firing 1 round per minute.	
Going into action....	1000	Going into action....	1000
At the end of the		At the end of the	
1st minute....	900	1st minute .	800
2nd do.	820	2nd do.	620
3rd do.	758	3rd do.	456
4th do.	713	4th do.	305
5th do.	677	5th do.	163
6th do.	661	6th do.	28

It is not pretended that, in the field, such sanguinary results are obtained; nor even, that the calculation is accurate to a fraction: but, it is quite sufficient to demonstrate that a *superiority* of fire, once established, (at short ranges where

men are exposed) *increases in rapid ratio*, and soon becomes absolutely overwhelming to those who can only maintain the slower, and feebler rate of fire. It remains to be seen, whether this all-important superiority of fire can be attained. We believe it can : and in a far greater ratio than that assumed above, which is only two to one. Whereas, we are of opinion that a superiority of four to one may, easily, be secured, at least for the first eighteen rounds ; an amount of fire which, in an affair of outposts, a dash at an enemy's position, resistance to an attempted surprise, or any of the desultory combats in which light troops are usually engaged, would meet every requirement.

The drawback to the common musket, or *minié*, is that you have to load. If you could go on perpetually firing, and never stopping to load, no enemy could stand long before you. Now, this result is obtained, in a very considerable degree, by the revolver ; and what we propose is, to arm our Light Infantry soldiers with "Repeating Rifles," * letting each man carry two extra cylin-

* The manufacture or supply of Repeating Rifles, of a description fit for the service, and adapted for the bayonet, presents no difficulty which may not easily be surmounted. We believe that Col. Colt would readily furnish the arm required at a moderate cost. In any case, superiority is, practically, cheap at any price, in war.

ders (ready loaded), in any manner ascertained to be the most convenient, and the remainder of his ammunition in his waist-belt; dispensing altogether with the cumbersome and inconvenient "pouch." The belt, if properly constructed, might be in some measure a support to the loins, and a preventative against cholera.*

How far this arm would be adapted to Battalion regiments, we will not stop to discuss. Our question is of light troops, whose especial duty it is to be alert and vigilant; and prepared for sudden and unexpected encounters, in their various duties as patrols, out-lying pickets, flanking parties, advanced guards, &c. And in their hands, we submit, the Repeating Rifle would be a most commanding and formidable weapon. With eighteen rounds immediately at their command (little more delay being occasioned in changing cylinders than in loading a common rifle), the fire of ten men, till this ammunition was expended, would be equal to that of forty men armed as at present; while their casualties, from being more extended, or presenting a smaller front, would probably not exceed a quarter of those of the larger body.

* The advantage of the belt is too well known in all countries exposed to cholera to require confirmation.

We have spoken of the arm, but not of the skill with which it should be used. Considering, that the main object of the musketeer is to fire; and that, on the result of that fire you, principally, depend for victory: it is marvellous how little trouble you take to make that fire accurate—that is, of any use at all.

By the “Queen’s Regulations,” for the army, ordinary Line regiments are allowed 30 rounds of ball cartridge, for practice, in the year! Light Infantry regiments have 50. Is it probable, or even possible, that soldiers should become good marksmen? A youth, who only had one or two days shooting in a twelvemonth,—perhaps not half a dozen in his life, would not be very formidable in a “battue:” unless, to his friends, and their gamekeepers.

It is constant practice—practice under every variety of circumstance, that makes the skilful shot. The Light Infantry soldier should, therefore, practise almost continually. He should fire at short ranges, and at long: standing, kneeling, and lying down: over parapets, through loopholes, between sand-bags: at measured distances, and at unknown ranges. He should be thoroughly familiar with the use of his rifle. He should feel a confidence in it, in every situation, and under every circumstance; in dim twilight, as in

c

the blaze of sunshine. A few prizes, and a little encouragement, as is given in the French army, to the "compagnies d'élite," (who get a trifling extra pay,) will do wonders to rouse the attention, and excite the energy of men.

In all sudden attacks, even by very superior numbers (to which detached parties are peculiarly liable), a firm stand, and a stout resistance to the first onset, are the grand objects. Self-reliance, and conscious power, from superiority of arms, and skill in their use, will be sure to give men steadiness and presence of mind. It will enable them, either to hold their post, against overwhelming numbers, until reinforcements move forward to their support; or, to retire, if ordered to do so, with coolness and little loss.

It is sometimes remarked, in the trenches before Sebastopol; that, "our men are not very good at night-work." How should it be otherwise? The German (and no doubt, the Russian) light troops are practised, frequently, by night; as well as by day. Parties are told off to attacks and others to defend, a wood, a village, or any other position. Pickets have to be surprised; a line of sentries to be passed, &c. &c. In fine, they are habituated to the various duties, which they are called on to discharge, in time of war. The result is confidence. But, who ever heard

of an English regiment being turned out after "tattoo?" It would shake the nerves of all the neighbourhood! Yet, the experience of this war has, already, proved how desirable it is, that soldiers should be habituated to moving, forming, and firing, by night as well as by day.

The most dashing and successful enterprises of light troops, in attack; as well as their greatest perils from the enemy, and risks of surprise, occur under cover of darkness. It is then, especially, that they should be alert and vigilant. It is then too, beyond all other times, that self-possession and confidence, whether in the advanced sentry, the out-lying picket, or the exploring party, will multiply power, and ensure safety.

The "Light Bob" should be ready for every emergency, by night or day. Never taken a-back, and never daunted. His peculiar duty is to secure the repose of the army to which he acts as sentinel. His comrades sleep in safety while he guards their front and flanks. To the force he covers and protects, he is the wary and sagacious watch-dog: to the enemy whom he watches and harasses, he is the wily and daring wolf. His province is to give security to the one; to allow no rest, repose, nor safety, to the other.

But the work of war is not done with aggres-

sive weapons only. The Light Infantry regiment should know how to turn every advantage and opportunity to account; to loop-hole a wall, throw up a breast-work, or sink a rifle pit; and by frequent practice, to become expert and active at such work. A few gabions, which are quickly made; or a few sand-bags, which are easily carried, soon afford cover to a party within reach of the enemy's rifles; in the exposed situation which is, often, best adapted for a look-out, or commands an important position. The Light Infantry man ought, therefore, to be familiar with these means of defence and protection, and be independent of the sapper, (for instruction how to make his gabions, &c.) and of the engineer officer, to set out the work "as we do at Woolwich."

It is difficult, in fine, to say where his duty ends, or of what branch of military knowledge he should be ignorant. We have enumerated, we fear, enough to startle any one, but an old campaigner; and he might, probably, suggest that a post may, often, be made more secure against cavalry, by a few "trous-de-loups;" a small "abattis;" or a short "chevaux de frise." We do not pretend to exhaust the subject. Our object only, is to draw attention to the necessity

of giving a more practical education to the soldier—especially to the Light Infantry man.

The value of good light troops can hardly be over-estimated. Even in the general action, they always play their busy and adventurous part. But, perhaps, scarcely one pitched battle is fought in an entire campaign. The daily wear and tear, however, is always telling on a force. Between two hostile armies, there is continually a line of contact, occupied usually by light troops; and, on that line, the contest, if not the actual fighting, is unceasing. It is a struggle of ingenuity, activity and endurance. It is a combat of acuteness and vigilance; of dash and daring. The soldier from whom the nation demands such service is, surely, worthy of her care and consideration: the soldier who ably and gallantly performs such duties, is deserving of her admiration and her gratitude!

If in arms, accoutrements, dress, drill, or training, we can add one particle to his comfort, or one degree to his efficiency, our trouble will be well repaid.

CHAPTER V.

RECRUITING.—THE PAY OF THE SOLDIER.

“ *A fair day’s wages, for a fair day’s work,*” is a very popular apothegm. But the soldier, whose exertions, in campaign, are often stretched even beyond the powers of human endurance, never sees this “*fair day’s wages.*”

The soldier, of all men, should be dealt with, if not in the most liberal, at least, in the most frank and loyal spirit. You require his fidelity. You invite him to a life of hardships and peril. And, you begin by practising on him a delusion, which is as ungenerous as, in the end, it is short-sighted and unwise. The recruit is offered a “*bounty*” which, in the Public House, where “he takes the shilling,” he believes will be paid in sterling gold! But, which he afterwards dis

covers, is absorbed, in great measure, by the purchase of his Kit.* His pay, he next finds out, is encroached upon, by the wear and tear of his clothes; which, often, he cannot controul. His miserable pittance, in fine, is eaten into by "stop-pages," for pipeclay, blacking, barrack-damages, barrel-browning, hair-cutting, and every variety

* List of a Soldier's "Kit," to be paid for out of his "bounty."

1 Knapsack, complete	0	16	0
1 Forage cap and number	0	2	4
1 Fatigue jacket.....	0	8	9
1 Pair summer trousers	0	7	6
3 Shirts 2/2	0	6	6
3 Pair Socks 1/1	0	3	3
2 Pair Boots 9/0	0	18	0
1 Stock and clasps.....	0	1	0
1 Pair Mitts	0	0	10
2 Pair Shoe brushes	0	1	2
1 Cloth brush	0	0	10
1 Hold-all	0	0	8
1 Sponge	0	0	5
1 Tin blacking	0	0	4
1 Pair Braces	0	1	0
1 Button stick and brush	0	0	6
1 Comb	0	0	4
1 Knife, fork, and spoon	0	0	10
1 Pair Scissors	0	0	8
2 Towels	0	1	2
Marking necessities	0	1	0
	<u>£</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>13</u>
			<u>1</u>

of paltry charge and diminution, to which a wretched shilling can be liable. Is it surprising, that he should, too often, consider his enlistment an unworthy deception : and, sometimes, seek his remedy in desertion ?

The army, as at present paid and treated, is little more than a refuge for the destitute youth of the United Kingdom. And less a refuge, unfortunately, than a trap ; into which the hapless lads who are too restless for the factory, too enterprising for farm labour, or too wrecked in character for domestic employment, unwarily fall. Look at our recruits, as they are marched up, under the *influence of beer and ribbons*, by the inveigling old Sergeant ! How many of those young men have deliberately formed their engagement ; or, have a distinct idea of their future position, or of the obligations which they have contracted ?

The marvel is not that a greater number of volunteers are not obtained : but, that so many should be induced to accept so ill-paid, and hard a life. And it shows what noble stuff, is at the bottom of our roughest and poorest population ; when we see, that lads, who usually start in life under such unfavourable conditions, that they are brought, often, as a last resource, into the Service : when drilled into order, and broken in, to discipline, develope into the steadiest and

smartest ;—as they are the bravest, and most indomitable soldiers in the world !

To talk, however, of promotion from the ranks, to any great extent, (under the present system) as an *inducement to enlist*, is to evince entire ignorance of the army. The difficulty, in time of war, is to find a sufficient number of men who are, even, fitted to hold the humbler, but scarcely less important position of non-commissioned officers. While our Army is so wretchedly paid, in proportion to the rest of the population :—while the inducements offered are so slight that, comparatively, few but youths of the most desperate fortunes will enlist :—and while even those poor inducements which you do offer, are little more than a deceptive bait, (the bounty which is partly absorbed by the fit-out, and the shilling a day which is diminished by stoppages,) it is idle to expect that class of men, from whom, as a rule, you can hope to form desirable officers, to enter the service.

You require, at this moment, 80,000 recruits,—regulars, or, militia. You have exhausted, in great measure, the supply of that class, which sufficed to keep up the ranks of a small army in time of peace ; but, which is not sufficient to meet the present increased demand—the drain of a Continental war. And now, if you want to buy

the labour, not to say the lives, of strong, active, and intelligent men; (and such, emphatically, are *the men you do require*;) you must pay them something approaching to the value of that labour, in the market. Men will not, usually, sell their service, to the State, for much less than it will fetch elsewhere.

You are obliged to recognise this, in the Royal Navy, to whom you give a rate of pay, which competes, pretty closely, with that of the mercantile marine. But, in the army, the private's cloth, of brick-dust red, is nearly the only set off you offer; for the difference, between a shilling, and half-a-crown a day. Still, we believe that the gallant and adventurous youth of England, have a love for the profession of arms;* and would joyously rally round our standards, if you would offer them something like a fair remuneration for their service. We believe that they would meet you half-way, and that, if the "bounty" were, only, paid fairly *in money*; the outfit given by the country; and the pay increased to *one and six-*

* In France, the *usual* price to be paid for a "*remplaçant*" is £ 60, or £ 70. At *present*, a substitute cannot be obtained for less than £ 100. (And this, be it remembered, for a 5 years' service only.) In England, a bounty of £ 10, *paid down*, would rapidly fill our ranks.

pence a day, 50,000 men might be raised within three months.

If you be determined to maintain the principle of VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT, instead of having recourse to CONSCRIPTION (that is, the ballot); to have free military service, instead of, forced; you must make up your minds to bear the difference of the cost. What you seize, as your right, you can deal with as you will. What you *purchase* honestly, you must pay for, *at its value*. You must make the service obligatory by conscription: or, buy that service at the market price. There are no other alternatives, if you wish to keep up an army, worthy of the power and position of England, and competent to meet the requirements of the war.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

PROFESSIONAL FEELING.—PUBLIC OPINION, ETC.

It is often argued, by the uncompromising advocates of the old school, that the soldier must be kept employed; and that the perpetual pipe-claying and polishing, are resources against idleness. But, have we not suggested occupations more varied, useful and instructive; while they are less monotonous and irksome? Men have an instinctive dislike to useless labour. It is notorious, that no punishment is so galling and hateful to the convict, as the treadmill, which, idly, grinds the air. While, if his labour be utilized, it becomes less penal.

There is a certain consolation—a sense of dignity, in useful labour, that comes home even to

the felon. Do you imagine, that the brave fellows who fight our battles, have less manly feeling, and self-respect? He, knows little of soldiers, who thinks so. We have frequently observed, with what cheerfulness they go through any amount of drill, or fatigue, which, they feel, has a *practical* object; how distasteful to them is the constant repetition of such pompous parade, for instance, as the pedantic "March past, in slow time."

Soldiers, as well as civilians, we are, at heart, a practical people. We take practical views, even in our amusements. It is not the sportsman who turns out neatest at covert side; nor, the hunter, which has the most showy action, and the finest form, that stands highest in our estimation. It is the man who rides straightest across the country; and the horse which lives through the longest and severest run. The same principle should be applied in our judgment of a regiment, or of an army.

Parade, show, and ornament, have their important, and valuable influences. They are indispensable in the army: and have their true philosophy in feelings, which are deeply seated in human nature. We would not sacrifice the aid of so valuable a *motive power*. All we contend for is, that they should hold their proper

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position: and be always made secondary, and ancillary, to the three grand objects to be kept in view—to *live*, to *march*, and to *fight*. The education of the soldier should be a preparation for the work he will have to do.

When urging the necessity for the equipment and training, we have described, more than one experienced and able officer has replied: "There is no doubt of the utility of such instruction. But where are you to get the ground, the materials, the funds, which you would require? *Government would not stand the expense.* Besides, these things are learnt afterwards, by experience, in the field." Such observations may form an apology for the past: but, they establish no argument for the future; if we prove that the adequate instruction, and training of the recruit, for his duties in the field, (to say nothing of justice and humanity,) is the truest, and safest economy.

No doubt, the young soldier may, possibly, receive his education in the field. We have seen, this spring, recruits at drill, practising the "*goose-step*," within range of the batteries of Sebastopol. We have seen hundreds, too, last winter, sink under hardships, which they were neither inured to, nor taught to contend against. The survivors, we dispute not, have learnt something. But it is an expensive, as well as a cruel education, which

is paid for at the price of suffering, and the death of, perhaps, half their comrades. What Colonel is there in the Crimea, whose heart has not bled, to see the poor, helpless boys, sent out to him last December and January, dying off by scores?—Whole drafts, absolutely, melting away. Did those poor fellows cost the country nothing?—nothing in treasure, as well as in shame and tears? * Such scenes, indeed, were beheld with silent fortitude, by men whom neither suffering, nor danger, can appal. But, will it be said that we should remember them with apathy, and invite their fatal recurrence?

If we would shun a repetition of these calamitous sacrifices, we must, as far as possible, remove every cause by which they were produced, or aggravated. One of those causes, manifestly, was the defective and unpractical education given to the soldier—taken as a preparation for *service in the field*.

There are, we do not dispute it, persons to be

* During a considerable portion of the winter an average of 1000 men, a week, were struck off the "Duty states." The deaths at Scutari were about 360 a week. In Camp, at Bala-klava, and on the voyage, the mortality could scarcely have been less than as many more. Much suffering, however, it must be borne in mind, was inevitable, from the nature of the service.

found in the army, (as in every other profession,) who cling with tenacious grasp, to ancient prejudices; to ideas and standards, long cherished; and to habits, confirmed by years. There are persons, with whom, routine is a sort of morality; and patronage, a principle:—old gentlemen, who look upon all progress, as an encroachment; and inventions, as revolutionary. The same sort of men, who used to foretell, (30 years ago,) that steam would be the ruin of our navy:—or, who prognosticated the loss of character and courage, with the sacrifice of pig-tails! This much we admit. But, it were a libel on the service, to suppose that, as a body, officers were not anxious to avail themselves of every valuable discovery and invention, which science offers, or ingenuity contrives. The honour and interests of the service, are the objects nearest their hearts, and they would gladly adopt every modification and improvement, (in arms, training or organization,) which is calculated to uphold the one, or promote the other. If they were not animated by this large, enlightened, and (we may say) national spirit, they would form a dwarfed and stunted exception, in the midst of their fellow-countrymen.

Look at every undertaking, in which intellect, daring, or enterprise, are required. You will find that the energetic, and practical mind of Eng-

land takes the lead. There is no conception too bold; no scheme too comprehensive; no achievement too hazardous, to arrest, or daunt our merchants, our capitalists, or our engineers. The daring thought—the inventive genius of our race ever rises to a level with its task. In combination, in mechanical science, in dashing adventure, we stand unrivalled. Why, in war, which offers her choicest favours and triumphs, to those who possess such qualities, should not the national characteristics be displayed?

Is it that, in this department, we have no inventive power; no men with combination and grasp of mind; none, even, with practical ingenuity, who can adapt our materials to their uses, our resources to their objects, and our tools to their work? We cannot think so. It would be too great an anomaly. Nature is not so eccentric. We have a right to be in war, what we are in commerce and enterprise.

This is sensitively and keenly felt: not only in the Service, but, throughout the entire Kingdom. With bewildered pride, and mortified astonishment, the Nation observes a beleaguered city, bidding defiance to her efforts, and foiling her attacks. The Country is sore and angry:—and, like all angry people, is somewhat unjust. She has broken down her Military establishments and

institutions, in time of peace : and is now indignant, because, she has not got the results, which those establishments could, alone, have produced. She has impaired the organization of her Army, from a short-sighted economy : and now, feels wronged that, in the infant days of its restoration, it has something of the incompleteness of youth.

That the Nation is dissatisfied with the success of the Campaign, it is idle to conceal. That this dissatisfaction is, *entirely*, unfounded, few, probably, will venture to affirm.

Accustomed to triumph over every obstacle, by persevering, and practical ability ; and to administer the most unwieldy enterprises, by the simple rule of employing those who, best, could do the work ; the people of England claimed from the War Office, the Ordnance, and the Horse Guards, the same process and the same results. They naturally, and perhaps reasonably, anticipated that the incidents of the War, and the exigences of the Service, would have drawn forth—we will not call it genius, but, at least, that practical energy, which over-rides the barriers of prejudice, and bursts through the trammels of routine. They expected to find that vigorous sense which, instinctively, goes straight to its object ; and effects its purpose, by the most

direct, and simple means.* It is part of the conviction of the people of this country;—a self-reliance, which has become a sort of National faith; that we can, and ought to overcome every difficulty, surmount every obstacle, and surpass every rival.

It was said of Nelson, that he banished the word “impossible.” It is so, with the British public. They admit no excuse for failure or disappointment. It once was pleaded to Napoleon, that two, not over-competent, *employés*, were

* It is difficult to divest oneself of the impression, that the Campaign has been singularly barren in original resource. The very fact of being baffled, in the ordinary application of force, throws back the mind upon its own fertile power. Even in the absence of those daring, and original conceptions, which belong to master minds, and appear to be the spontaneous growth of genius; the energy and ingenuity, which are ever at command, are capable of performing much useful service. Are the Russian batteries (for example) repaired, during the hours of darkness; so as to counteract, almost entirely, the effect of our fire by day? Well, meet that evil, by having *no hours of darkness*, no intermission of fire. We have Military Engineers, no doubt, who could, readily, accomplish the object. If not, employ Civilians, who would gladly undertake the task of lighting up the entire Lines of Sebastopol, at “so much a night.” We might multiply instances, if it were our object to enlarge upon a subject, which is foreign to the purpose of this little pamphlet.

“ des gens très *comme il faut*.” “ Cela se peut,” replied the Emperor, “ mais ils ne sont pas des gens, *comme il m'en faut*.” And he removed them.

It is not without some feelings of diffidence and delicacy that we touch this part of the subject. We recoil from joining in an unworthy assault upon time-honoured names. We would disturb, with respectful voice, the slumber of those, who repose on glorious memories. But repose of any sort is fatal, in a race. To stand still, or move feebly, is simply, to be “ nowhere ” —to be distanced : *and war is a race of energy, of intellect, and of daring*. It is, essentially, a trial of strength. Victory is for the strongest—the strongest, not merely in numbers, or material appliances : but, in every resource, and faculty, and power, which makes up the Soldier, and the General.

We have attempted, for our share, in a small and practical way, to point out how the Soldier, (in one arm of the Service, at least,) may be rendered more efficient. We believe we have advanced nothing, which experience in the field has not established ; or, reason, and practical sense, approved. If we have exposed defects ; we have submitted remedies. It is for others to reject our